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The key word in recent debates on labour market
policy has been flexicurity. Is it possible to combine
security for employees with flexibility for employers
so as to ensure a well functioning labour market
with low unemployment? Denmark has been high-
lighted as a flexicurity country which, via flexible
hiring and firing rules as well as a generous social
safety net, has balanced the two concerns in a way
that has been conducive to labour market flexibili-
ty and low unemployment. Since the unemploy-
ment rate in Denmark has been below the Euro-
pean average for several years, many observers
have readily concluded that the Danish system
works and has positive results. Hence, it is often
seen as a model for other countries.
Labour market developments in Denmark have
indeed been impressive:in mid-2008 the unemploy-
ment rate was close to 1.5 percent (structural unem-
ployment is assessed to be 3 to 3.5 percent). Unem-
ployment has been reduced to a historically low
level, and the debate has shifted from focusing on a
“shortage of jobs”to a “shortage of hands”.This de-
elopment has been achieved without significant
cut-backs in welfare state provisions, including the
social safety net, and employment growth has been
consistent with distributional objectives. While
business cycle factors have been important for
reducing unemployment in Denmark, structural
changes have also been important. The following
focuses on characterizing Danish labour market
policies and on explaining what accounts for the
improvement in the labour market situation over
the last 10–15 years.
The dramatic change from high and persistent unem-
ployment to very low unemployment and the im-
plied change in the perception of the Danish labour
market are succinctly summarized by the following
OECD quotes on Denmark:
“The malfunctioning of the labour market is at
the core of the macroeconomic imbalances in
the Danish Economy”, (OECD Economic Sur-
vey Denmark 1990, 57).
“... the flexible labour market, combined with
active support for those losing jobs,makes a good
starting point to benefit from globalisation”,
OECD Economic Survey Denmark 2008, 21).
How did this change come about? And what can
other countries learn from this experience?
The Danish developments and experience offer in-
teresting insights on how to strengthen labour mar-
ket incentives under tight distributional constraints.
Denmark has an extended welfare system with a
tightly-knit social safety net and a high level of pub-
lic service provisions, all of which are tax financed.
Labour market policies and institutions are an inte-
gral part of the welfare state. The Danish welfare
model is based on ambitious egalitarian objectives,
and a strengthening of the incentive structure by gen-
eral reductions in benefits that constitute the social
safety net is not a possible policy avenue. Working
poor is not a policy option in Denmark.At the same
time, it is important to note that an extended, tax-
financed welfare state presupposes that a large frac-
tion of the population is in employment.Thus,for the
model to be financially viable, the employment rate
must be high. The reason is simple: when unable to
support themselves,most people have an entitlement
to some income support, and at the same time, their
tax payments are lowered. It is therefore no surprise
that Denmark (and the other Scandinavian coun-
tries) have a high labour force participation rate. To
put it differently, the welfare model is employment
focused.The critical and challenging issue is thus how
to strike a balance between the social/distributional
objectives and the need to maintain a high employ- * School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.ment ratio.This balance was lost
in the 1970s and 1990s, but the
reform process since the mid-
1990s has contributed to re-
establishing it.
The Danish case
The short version of the Danish
story is as follows:hiring and fir-
ing rules are rather flexible, and
the unemployment insurance
scheme is generous by interna-
tional standards. However, this
was also the case in the period
from the mid-1970s to the early
part of the 1990s, where Den-
mark was routinely listed as a
crisis country with problems for almost any macro-
economic indicator, including high and persistent
unemployment (see the OECD quote above).There-
fore,the flex and the security part of the Danish pol-
icy package cannot alone account for the drop in
unemployment. This is not denying that these
aspects have attractive implications, but they are no
guarantee for a low and stable unemployment rate.
To account for the Danish experience, a series of
reforms during the 1990s must be looked at. The
main thrust of these was a shift from a passive
approach towards labour market policies to a more
active focus on job search and employment.The pol-
icy tightened eligibility for unemployment benefits,
shortened their duration and introduced workfare
elements into unemployment insurance and social
policies in general. The shift in policy and labour
market performance should also be seen in view of
macroeconomic developments, which contributed to
an up-turn in economic activity and thus also to the
political support for the changes.The term flexicuri-
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work in 6 of the 
last 36 months.
Duration: max 4 
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Age below 30: after 6 months
Age between 30 and 60: after 9
months
Age above 60: after 6 months
Repeated offers
After 2 ½ years full-time activation









For recipients of social
assistance whose main
problem is assessed to
be unemployment –
the same requirements
as for those receiving
unemployment bene-
fits
Age between 25 and 30 and no
education: education offers after
6 months (alternatively lower bene-
fits) 
Age between 25 and 30: after 5
weeks anoffer of 8 weeks’ duration,
after 13 weeks anoffer of 18 
months’ duration 
Above 30: after 9 months
a)The actual activity andduration varies across the different groups.
  Source: Andersen (2008).CESifo DICE Report 4/2008 17
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ty is therefore in some sense a misnomer for the
“Danish” model. When the model was based solely
on flexibility and security, it did not perform well,
and public transfers grew considerably. The unem-
ployment rate reached 10 percent, and the fraction
of the age group 15–66 receiving public transfers
increased from about 10 percent in 1970 to 30 per-
cent in the early 1990s. The social safety net thus
served to protect incomes but
did not have an employment
focus,which had dramatic conse-
quences for public financing.The
model began to function better
when an additional element was
added – active labour market
policies – with a clear emphasis
on job search and employment
(Figure 1). Prior to the reforms,
the welfare system was essential-
ly a passive player between firms
benefiting from flexibility and
workers from income security.
As is often the case in tripartite
relations, the passive player is at
a clear disadvantage. When a
more active approach was taken
in labour market policies, it be-
came possible to strengthen em-
ployment while maintaining fle-
xibility and income security.
The single most important change
as a result of the reforms initiated
in the mid-1990s is that participa-
tion in activation measures no
longer qualifies for remaining eli-
gible for benefits. Before this
change, the passive period was effectively open-ended
because benefits combined with occasional job train-
ing would ensure continued eligibility for benefits.
After the reform, the benefit period became shorter
and activation compulsory for claimants of benefits.
Furthermore participation is no longer sufficient for
fulfilling the employment criteria to remain eligible
for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, i.e., the
transition from UI benefits to
social assistance (also associated
with activation requirements) is a
real option. The Table above
gives a summary overview of the
workfare requirements attached
to the social safety net in Den-
mark as of 2007.
The reduction in the rate of
unemployment in Denmark is
impressive (Figure 2a), and it
was mainly driven by an increase
in employment. However, as
illustrated in Figure 2b a large
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Figure 3age group 18–64 is still dependent on public trans-
fers. While there has been some reduction in this
share,it is still at a high level.Hence,while the unem-
ployment problem has been solved, there is still a
significant non-employment problem for a large
share of the population.
The flexicurity feature of the Danish labour market
is reflected in several indicators.A key characteristic
is a large incidence of short-term unemployment,i.e.,
many are affected by unemployment within the year,
but mostly only for a short period of time. In Figure
3, the fraction of the work force that experiences
unemployment in a given year is depicted.
In 2003 the unemployment rate was about 4.5 per-
cent, but about 15 percent of the work force was
affected by unemployment within the year. So
although the unemployment rate has fallen by more
than 60 percent from 1993 to 2007, the number of
people affected by unemployment has only dropped
by around 35 percent in the same period; i.e., short
spells of unemployment are not uncommon. This
indicates that job tenure is relatively short in
Denmark. However, surveys persistently show that
employees in Denmark perceive a high degree of
security (Parent-Thirion et al. 2007), suggesting that
the Danish labour market is functioning well under
the current business cycle conditions.
Insurance versus incentives
A generous social safety net including unemploy-
ment benefits and social assistance provides income
insurance for workers. This has a direct welfare
effect on risk-averse workers,but it may also be con-
ducive to risk taking and thus
labour market flexibility. How-
ever, any form of insurance rais-
es problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. These incen-
tive problems have been widely
analysed in the literature, which
has pointed to the detrimental
effects of generous unemploy-
ment insurance for search incen-
tives, etc. The political dilemma
between insurance and incen-
tives implies that countries with
high unemployment insurance
would have incentive problems
in the labour market and thus
higher unemployment. The Danish experience does
not confirm this view.
Active labour market policies broadly interpreted
are important in reconciling insurance and incen-
tives.Appropriately designed labour market policies
can be used to strengthen job search incentives with-
out reductions in benefit levels. The latter is not a
real policy option in a country with strong distribu-
tional concerns.
Studies of active labour market policies have fo-
cused on the direct consequences of programme par-
ticipation. Is there a programme effect which im-
proves the subsequent chances of finding a job?
While it is important to consider these direct effects,
it is equally important to consider the indirect effects
since they may have important implications for the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
Associating some activity requirement with the enti-
tlement to benefits after a specified duration of
unemployment effectively amounts to having a ben-
efit level which is duration dependent. The depen-
dency is created because the benefit cannot be
claimed passively. Work requirements strengthen
incentives precisely in the same way a declining ben-
efit profile does.This means that the effects of work-
fare elements should not be evaluated solely by the
direct programme effect on the unemployed; the
indirect effect on the unemployed in terms of
increased job searching must also be taken into
account. Figure 4 illustrates the effect on individual
utility of a workfare requirement. Moreover, wage
formation will also be affected since the workfare
element reduces the outside options of the em-
ployed. A more detailed analysis of the effects of
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SHIFT IN LABOUR MARKET POLICY: FROM INFINITE BENEFIT 
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workfare in terms of striking a balance between
insurance and incentives in the labour market can be
found in Andersen and Svarer (2008).
Workfare also has screening effects because it
reduces the possibility of passively claiming benefits
as an alternative to work. Individuals who have a
strong preference for non-work alternatives (or
engage in black sector activities) will not be able to
finance these activities through the benefit system.
Fine-tuning active labour market policies
The reduction in unemployment implies that active
labour market policies have been adjusted over the
years to take into account both the effects of policy
shifts but also the changing composition of the stock
of unemployed as a result of the reduction in the
unemployment level.
Designing active labour market policies involves a
number of concerns.Such activities are costly (direct
costs of active labour market policies amount to 1.3
percent of GDP in Denmark), and the shift in the
trade-off between incentives and insurance is thus
not obtained for free. Two aspects are particularly
important, namely timing and programme types.
The frontloading of workfare requirements will
strengthen incentives the most, but it is also very
costly, and it will entail a large deadweight loss from
programme participation for many who are likely to
find a job after a short unemployment spell. This is
particularly so in a labour market with a high inci-
dence of short-term unemployment periods. Hence,
workfare requirement should be
imposed after some duration of
unemployment.
The group of unemployed is het-
erogeneous, spanning from
those who have the qualifica-
tions and experience making
them readily employable to
those who lack these properties
(e.g. due to long-term unem-
ployment) and therefore find it
very difficult to get a job.For the
former group, help with job
searching may be sufficient,
while for the latter more specific
programmes may be needed to
specifically address the constraints lowering their job
finding rate.In some cases,it may be easy to identify
these constraints (e.g.,if the unemployed lack specif-
ic skills) while in others it may be more difficult and
also depend on market conditions (qualifications
become obsolete due to structural changes). In the
latter case, avoidance of deadweight losses provides
an argument for making workfare programmes du-
ration dependent.
These considerations lead to an optimal profile for
workfare requirements as illustrated in Figure 5,
where the requirements run from general and rela-
tively costless activities to specific and more costly
activities, depending on the duration of the unem-
ployment spell. The duration-dependent sequencing
of workfare requirements works to minimize dead-
weight losses and programme costs while maintain-
ing the incentive effects and addressing more specif-
ic programmes to groups for whom it may make a
difference.
The selection or targeting of workfare programmes
in individual cases may be strengthened by making
both participation and the type of workfare pro-
gramme dependent on some observational character-
istics (e.g., extensive educational programmes only
available to unemployed without formal education)
or by distinguishing between different groups. The
latter is done in the Danish social assistance scheme,
where claimants are divided into five different
groups depending on the extent to which they are
assessed to be able to work, and the workfare
requirements/programme content differ across the
groups. A more sophisticated way of targeting pro-
grammes is via so-called profiling. Here statistical
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Figure 5programmes are used to select which programme (if
any) is expected to have the largest effect in reducing
the length of unemployment spells for a particular
individual with given personal characteristics. The
advantage of using statistical tools is that accumulat-
ed experience from all previous unemployment spells
can be used. Currently, several countries including
Germany, Switzerland and Sweden are considering
introducing statistical targeting tools to assist pro-
gramme selection (see, e.g., Staghoej et al. 2007).
Business cycle dependence
A key question is to what extent active labour mar-
ket policies should be business-cycle dependent.This
applies at two levels.At the economic level,it may be
argued that supply-oriented policies are more effec-
tive in a situation where there is an upward trend in
the demand for labour. At the political level, it may
be argued that it is easier to maintain support for
active supply-oriented policies in a situation where
unemployment is decreasing. Given current projec-
tions for global economic developments, it is there-
fore an open question as to how the flexicurity
model in general and the active labour market poli-
cy in particular will work under less favourable busi-
ness cycle circumstances. If unemployment rises sig-
nificantly, there is a risk of an overload of activation
policies which will either lead to a cost hike and thus
a burden on public finances or a reduction in the
efficiency of the programmes.
Another issue is how to adopt workfare policies to a
situation with higher unemployment. Two responses
are possible. One is to shift the different workfare
stages to longer unemployment durations, that is, a
horizontal shift of the steps in Figure 5.This is similar
to an extension of the benefit period in periods with
high unemployment as is done in the US and Canada.
Another is to reconsider the specific types of activa-
tion policies to be used. At the current low level of
unemployment, most of the long-term unemployed
have some barriers significantly reducing job-finding
rates. However, in a slump more “core” workers will
be affected by unemployment and also experience
longer duration than at present. For these groups, the
primary problem is not lack of qualifications and
experience per se, but rather to ensure that these do
not depreciate too much due to unemployment. This
may be countered by a high incidence of short-term
activation programmes intended to keep the partici-
pants in close contact with the labour market.
Conclusion
The significant reduction in unemployment on the
Danish labour market since the mid-1990s is remark-
able since it has been achieved without resorting to
general benefit reductions.This shows that it is pos-
sible to improve incentives in the labour market
without turning to benefit reductions. The pivotal
elements are the activation policies and the shorten-
ing of the benefit period.These measures work both
directly by shortening benefit duration and indirect-
ly via the conditions arising from activation. How-
ever, these changes have not come without costs
since the active labour market policies require con-
siderable resources. In light of the expected down-
turn in the global and also in the Danish economy, it
will be interesting to see whether the Danish flexicu-
rity model will also perform well when unemploy-
ment increases.
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